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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY RELIGIOUS
REQUIREMENTS IN CHILD CARE
WHEN parents are unfit, unwilling, or unable to care for their children,
the state intervenes to protect the child's welfare.1 The prime consideration
for state action is the child's best interests. 2 However, since parental rights
are not easily severed,3 there must be a clear showing of parental inadequacy
before a court will substitute its judgment of the child's needs for that of his
parents. 4 One of the most vital parental prerogatives is the right to control
the child's religious training.5 Statutes, case law and administrative regula-
tions demonstrate the concern of legislatures, courts, and departments of
welfare in preserving the religious faith of children who must be placed away
from their parents.0 The degree to which religious considerations are part of
or prevail over considerations of the child's best interests varies among the
states and results in diverse effects on the administration of child welfare
programs.
Existing Rules
Three approaches to the importance of religion in child placement are ex-
emplified in present practice.7 Some jurisdictions adopt the equity rule that,
1. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 201, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907) ; In re Sharp,
15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908). See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Ri'v. 104
(1909).
2. Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920) ; Commonwealth ex rel. v.
Daven, 268 Pa. 416, 148 At. 524 (1930); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78
(1949); PomEoY, EQUITY JURIsDIcTION § 1307 (5th ed. 1941) ; MADDEN, DOMESTIc RE-
LATIONS §§ 107-09 (1931).
3. Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522 (1905). The rights of fit parents cannot be
severed without their consent.
4. E.g., People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952).
5. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944) (dictum).
6. For a comprehensive collection and a detailed analysis of the cases and statutes
dealing with religion and child placement, see Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoplion,
Guardianship and Custody, 54 COLTJm. L. REv. 376 (1954). Administrative regulations are
set out in note 12 infra and accompanying text. The cases deal with the separate problems
of adoption, guardianship, and custody, but are used interchangably as precedent and in-
volve the same legal considerations in so far as the instant problem is concerned.
7. Case law within as well as among the states is inconsistent. Thus, precedent for
more than one rule may exist within a state. Compare Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div.
373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 304 N.Y. 483,
109 N.E.2d 71 (1952), where the court ordered two children, who had been well-placed,
removed from a home of a different religion, with 1; re Krenkel, 278 App. Div. 573,
102 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2nd Dep't 1951), where an adoption of an illegitimate child across
religious lines was affirmed without opinion despite the natural parents' marriage and
the withdrawal of the mother's consent. See PFTmER, CHURCH, STATE AND Fu Dom 649
n.30 (1953). Decisions within the same court sometimes conflict. Compare Matter of
Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y. Supp. 355 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936), where the
child's best interests determined custody, with Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.
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since the child's best interests must govern, religion is only one of many
factors for consideration.8 In other jurisdictions religious considerations pre-
vail unless the child's welfare dearly demands care which is unavailable from
custodians of the same religion.0 These approaches differ in degree; neither
permits religion to become an absolutely controlling factor. On the other
hand, a third rule completely eliminates judicial and administrative discretion:
custodians and probation officers are required to be of the same religion as
the child's parents regardless of other compelling circumstances. 10
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942), where religious considerations played a dominant role. Compare
also In re Riley, 20 Pa. Dist. 745 (1911), with Commonwealth cx rel. Burke v. Birch, 169
Pa. Super. 537, 83 A.2d 426 (1951). Courts of some states have not yet passed on the issue.
S. Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction over the custody of children. For the
development of this jurisdiction, see STORY, EQUITY J.MSPRUDE.,CE §§ 1743-52 (14th ed.
1918). The chancellor exercised wide powers of discretion in determining custody solely
on the basis of the child's best interests. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 42, 14S N.E. 624
(1925).
Several jurisdictions have adopted this equity approach. Whalen v. Olmstead, 61
Conn. 263, 23 Atl. 964 (1891) ; In re Guardianship of Vaite, 190 Iowa 182, 180 N.W. 159
(1920); Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920); In re McKenzie, 197
Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Donie v. Ferree, 175 Pa. Super.
586, 106 A2d 681 (1954). In addition, some courts have held statutes requiring children
to be placed with persons of the same religion "whenever practicable" to be merely
advisory. Guardianship of Walsh, 100 Cal. App. 2d 194, 223 P2d 322 (1950); People
ex rel. v. Bolton, 27 Colo. App. 39, 146 Pac. 489 (1915); State cx rel. Baker v. Bird,
253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913) ; Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 Ad. 683 (192-0).
9. Some courts have interpreted statutes which require custodians to be of the same
religion as the child "whenever practicable!' as limiting the court's discretion, but not elimi-
nating it. In approving an adoption across religious lines, one court said, "whereas before
the new statute there was no definite rule binding upon the judge in any set of circum-
stances as to how much weight was to be given to any one of the several elements as
against the others, he is now bound to give controlling effect to identity of religious faith
when practicable but not otherwise." Petition of Gally, 329 fass. 143, 107 N._2d 21,
25 (1951). See also State ex ret. Evangelical Lutheran Kinderfreund Society v. White,
123 Minn. 503, 144 NAV. 157 (1913). Cases often allow placement across religious lines
with the proviso that the child must be educated in the parents religion. Matter of
Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y. Supp. 387 (Surr. Ct. 1915) ; Matter of Korte, 78 Misc. 276,
139 N.Y. Supp. 444 (County Ct. 1912) ; cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa.
Super. 147, 15 A.2d 76 (1940).
10. Several states have equated the best interests of its children with religious con-
siderations. Two states have enacted mandatory statutes which prohibit placement with
custodians of a different religion. N.D. Rav. CODE § 27-1622 (1943) ; R.I. GEN. LAws
c. 616, § 12 (1938), R.I. LAws 1946 c. 1772, § 26. And DI).. CODE Ainx. tit. 13, § 911
(1953), requires at least one adoptive parent to be of the same religion unless the parents
stipulate either a different religion or their indifference. While no court has yet interpreted
the statute, it might be held impossible to arrange an adoption across religious lines if both
parents are dead. Maine has an involved placement requirement. M. Rsx. STAT. c. 25,
§ 252 (1954). Children must be placed in homes of the same religion. If such a home
is unavailable, they must be placed in an institution governed by persons of the same
religion. If no such institution is available, the child is to be placed in a suitable home
or institution until one of the same religion can be found.
A mandatory requirement was created from a "when practicable" statute in Matter of
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Treatment of religion as a determinative factor in child placement is more
prevalent than is commonly assumed." While mandatory requirements appear
in the statutes or case lav of only a few states, administrative regulations or
practices in others often apply discretionary statutory language in a similarly
rigid manner. 12 These actions are rarely exposed to judicial review,' a but their
Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951), appeal dimilissed on other
grounds, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952). In that case, two children were entrusted
to Jewish care by their Catholic mother. Four years later the mother sought to regain
custody from prospective adoptive parents. The Appellate Division reversed the trial
court's findings that it was for the best interests of the children to remain in the adoptive
home, and ordered the children removed to a Catholic institution. "When practicable"
was interpreted to mean "when available," leaving no discretion in the court as long as
room could be found for the children in an institution of the same faith. The weakness of
this rationale is demonstrated by respondent's complete failure to raise this argument before
the court of appeals. See Brief for Respondent, Matter of Santos, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d
71 (1952). Cf. Petition of Gaily, supra note 9. But see Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.2d
843 (Mass. 1954), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3201 (U.S. 1955), (which is in accord with
Santos. The Santos case was critically discussed in Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 694 (1952), and
in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREDOM 588-91 (1953).
A recent investigation of adoption practices in New York City indicates this statute
is so rigorously applied that the phrase "when practicable" is disregarded. GELLIIORN,
CHILDREN AND FAmILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEWV YORK CITY 263-65 (1954). But see
Letter from Shad Polier, Counsel, Louise Wise Services, N.Y., to Yale Law JQurflal,
April 8, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library: "[D]uring the past thirty years [almost alil
Surrogates ... have permitted adoptions across religious lines upon proof ... that this i
in accordance with the natural mother's wishes and ... not in a single instance . . . has a
Surrogate refused an adoption on such ground." And see In re Krenkel, 278 App. Div. 574,
102 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1951), discussed in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STArr AND Firuomt 6,49
n.30 (1953).
11. Information was solicited from seventeen children's courts and from the Depart-
ments of Welfare of every state. Thirty four states and eight courts responded and
many forwarded administrative regulations dealing with child welfare programs. Private
child welfare agencies, civic organizations concerned with child welfare, social workers,
probation officers, and children's court judges were also consulted by letter and interview
(hereinafter cited as INTERvi.Ews). This material supplied much of the information relied
on in the subsequent portions of this note and is on file at the Yale Law Library.
12. For examples of administrative regulations: In Missouri, "a child must be placed
in a home of like'religious faith ...... Mo. DEP'T OF WELFARE, FOSTER HoME CARE,
CHILD WELFARE MANUAL 14. Cf. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.160, 211.140, 211.390 (Vernon
1949). An administrative inconsistency seems to exist, however, since the State Child
Welfare Supervisor feels that emotional well-being and the potential for satisfactory
parenthood are more essential for foster parents than educational and cultural background,
and that mandatory criteria for placement "would seem very unwise." Letter from Miss
Lorena Scherer, State Child Welfare Supervisor, Missouri, Feb, 24, 1954.
The New York administrative regulations are not uniform. A mandatory requirement
is imposed on placement in foster homes, N.Y. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, SOCIAL WELFARE
MANUAL pt. III, p. 27 (1952), while the "when practicable" requirements of the statute
are spelled out regarding adoption, id. at 58, and children's institutions, N.Y. DLP'T 01
SOCIAL WELFARE, AIntS AND PRACTICES FOR CHILDREN'S INSTITUTIONS 23 (1951).
In New Jersey, "[the public] agency is bound by law to place a child in a home of
the same religion as its parents, and the private agencies, although not so required,
usually do." Letter from J. E. Alloway, Executive Director, Board of Child Welfare,
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importance in the field of child placement becomes evident as an increasing
number of children are handled by such agencies.
1 4
NJ., June 24, 1954. A similar requirement is set out in STATE BoARD OF CHILD WLFAPEF,
A Hokm SHOTJLD PROvIE 6 (1950). Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-26 (Supp. 1954). NXw
Jersey is the only state which requires references from a clergyman before a couple can
petition for adoption. Letter from J. E. Alloway supra. The Mimiit STA:D.IJS oF
APPRovED Anosrioz PPacTcE, promulgated by the Board of Child Welfare as a guide
to private agencies, recites a "whenever possible" requirement.
For examples of administrative practice: In Maryland, "the law requires that children
be placed in foster homes or institutions of the same religious faith as their families and
that requirement is carried out in selecting the placement plan for the child . . . . The
standards set for selection of foster and adoption homes are by administrative regulation,
except the legal requirement that children be placed in homes of the same religiuus faith
as the homes from which they came." Letter from Thomas J.S. Waxter, Director, State
Department of Public Welfare, Maryland, March 5, 1954. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE GrN. L.%v, s
art. 88A, § 26 (1951).
In Arkansas, "unless there is a special request, there is nu restriction as to foster parents
of the same religion but, in adoption, children are placed only in homes falling into the
same main religious group ...... Letter from Miss Ruth Johnston, Director of Child
Welfare, Arkansas, March 3, 1954. Cf. ARK. STAT. AN.. § 45-2-9 (1949).
In Colorado, "children are always placed in homes of their own religious faith."
Letter from Marie C. Smith, Director, Child Welfare Division, Department of Public
Welfare, Colorado, April 13, 1954. Cf. COLO. R.Ev. ST.T. ANN. c. 22, art. 1, § 7(3)
(1953).
For examples of inflexible but not mandatory requirements: California will only allow
placements across religious lines with parental consent. Letter from C.I. Schottlud,
Director, Department of Social Welfare, California, March 5, 1954; DWT" %5 SOC..L
VLFARE, STANDARDS FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA 8 (1947). Cf. CAL
WEI. & INSTS. CODE §§ 551, 552 (1952). The Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, Lucas County, Ohio, follows a similar procedure. Letter from Paul
V. Alexander, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Lucas
County, Ohio, March 6, 1954. Cf. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.32 (1954). In the absence
of any statute, Texas applies the same rule, TExAS STATE D&'T OF PUBnLIC WELFARE,
MANzUAL OF SELvics § 2362.14(1) (1952), and the Juvenile Court, Dade County, Florida
generally insists on preserving religious identity. Letter from Walter H. Beckham, Judge,
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Dade County, Florida, Feb. 26, 1954.
13. Research has disclosed no case in which an administrative regulation in this field
was challenged. The primary reason for this is that most of the cases deal with placemnt
so that the children involved are almost always dependent, neglected, or delinquent and
come from low income families who lack both the awareness and the means to complain
of the regulations and procedures. See PoLmR, EvE voxF's CHILDREN, NoWoY's CHILD
92-98 (1941) ; Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 116 (1909). Children's
court procedure is under the almost absolute control of the individual judge. Few persons
before the court have legal advice. And, since the pruceedings are confidential, few
parents would like to subject their child to the notoriety uf an appeal. Thus, abuses can
and do occur. See id. at 118-19, quoting from Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, SS Pac. 0s69
(1907). See also KAH.%, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 98-123, 268-70 (1953); GLuLLu: N,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 81-86. These two books were sponsored by the Citizens' Cm-
mittee on Children of New York City and the Bar of the City of New York respectively,
and are excellent studies of New York City's children's courts.
14. Twenty three states reported an increase in the number of children given service
either for adoption or placement. Seven could not furnish statistics and four rtportcd the
number of children handled had remained constant over the past several years. See Arnold,
Meeting the Needs of Childen and Youth, 25 Soc. SERV. REv 156 (1951).
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Effect of Religious Requirements on Child Welfare
Stringent religious requirements have several adverse effects on child welfare
programs. By unduly restricting discretion, they limit the utilization of modern
techniques for providing child care and preclude the effective use of available
facilities. Furthermore, they restrict the choice and hamper the efficiency of
probation officers. And when imposed as a condition of probation, they play
a doubtful or negative role in the rehabilitation of neglected and delinquent
children.
Effect on use of scientific techniques. Psychological and sociological techniques
are relied upon in most states to implement provisions for child welfarei
These techniques operate on the premise that children's needs are determined
by many interrelated factors.10 Since these factors vary from case to case,
no hard and fast rules can prove effective in all situations."7 Older children
generally respond to institutional care while children under six years of age
require a home environment.' 8 Normal children can be cared for fairly easily;
15. Twenty three states submitted their regulations setting up minimum standards for
child placement and child caring agencies. All required such agencies to maintain trained
staffs to conduct social studies of every child in order to determine his needs, and child
placement agencies are required to investigate prospective homes in the same way. Most
of these states follow the recommendations in CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERiWcA,
STANDARDS OF FOSTER CARE FOR CHILDREN IN INSTITUTIONS and STANDARDS FOR Cull.-
DREN'S ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING FOSTER FAMILY CARE. See also Lerner, Diagnostic
Basis of Institutional Care for Children, 33 Soc. CASEWORK 105 (1952) ; Lenroot, Child
Welfare-A Challenge to Both Private and Public Agencies, 24 Soc. SEav. REv., 1, 4
(1950).
Most statutes creating specialized children's courts provide either for a psychiatric
bureau as part of the court staff, e.g., N.Y. DoM. R. Cr. AcT § 33, or authorize the
court to order psychiatric examinations when necessary, MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs
art. 26, § 62 (1951). Children's courts also have a trained staff of probation officers or
access thereto.
Social studies also play an important part in adoptions. An investigation of the suita-
bility of the child for placement in the adoptive home is a prerequisite for any adoption
petition. The state departments of welfare are usually responsible for conducting such investi-
gations, but often accept those already performed by competent private agencies. For the
adverse effect of too strict religious requirements on investigations, see Krakow v. Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N.E.2d 184 (1950).
16. The factors set out in this paragraph of the text were compiled from the literature
supplied by twenty four states. The other states included no information on the subject.
All criteria are administrative and the result of experience in the field of child care, except
religion which is made mandatory by law in some states and by regulation in others. See
notes 10 and 11 supra.
17. "There are no concrete criteria for determining what type of home will best serve
the needs of a particular child . . . that can be written down objectively and applied like
a ruler." Letter from Miss Esther L. Immer, Supervisor of Special Studies, Department
of Social Welfare, Iowa, April 12, 1954. Twenty other states indicated that each child
presented an individual case which could only be handled by individual consideration.
18. "With one or two exceptions, institutions are not used for infants or pre-school
children. Adolescent children are more likely to need and accept group homes." Letter
from Fred DelliQuardi, Director, Division for Children and Youth, State Department of
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the physically or emotionally handicapped require specialized treatment. All
prospective custodians should meet general standards of financial security,
emotional stability, and appropriate motivation. But intellectual capacity of
both parent and child, ability of the former to develop special aptitudes, and
a racial, cultural, and religious background to which the individual child can
readily adjust require particular attention in each case.
Mandatory religious requirements ignore the basic premise that each place-
ment problem is unique.19 This is most clearly illustrated in the extreme cases
where, despite the traumatic effect of disrupting a satisfactory adjustment,
children have been withdrawn from the homes of custodians having a different
religion.2 0 But in any placement situation a requirement which subordinates
all other considerations precludes a determination of the best interest of the
child.21 Religion should be treated as any other factor entering into decisions
Public Welfare, Wisconsin, March 30, 1954. "No child under six is recommended for
institutional care by this agency." Miss Ruth Johnston, Director of Child Welfare,
Arkansas, March 3, 1954. Twenty six states follow this practice.
19. "The weight given to these various factors is a matter of discretion with the judge.
... The application of all these criteria in an individual situation is a matter of judgment,
training and experience." Letter from Miss Ruth Bowen, Supervisor, Children's Division,
Department of Social Welfare, Michigan, March 12, 1954. "In regard to the relative
weight of these criteria, this has not been given consideration since the factors above are
considered in relation to what is best for the child, and since degree of capacity as parents
may differ in certain instances it does not seem possible that we could structuralize these
criteria in such a way as to assign specific weights to them. The main question is...
WXhat is best for the child? ...." Letter from Joseph H. Roe, Director, Division of
Child Welfare Services, Montana, March 2, 1954. Similar statements were received from
seven other states. No specific importance was attached to any one criterion except
in those states with mandatory religious requirements. See notes 10 and 12 smpra.
20. See Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951),
appeal disnissed o; other grounds, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E2d 71 (1952), where the'appel-
late court ordered the removal of two children from a Jewish adoptive home to a Catholic
agency despite the trial court's findings that the evidence "clearly portrays the happiness
of the children, their sense of being Jewish, and the unusually fine opportunity now open
to them.' Transcript of Record, p. 682, Matter of Santos, 304 N.Y. 483 (1952). The trial
court had concluded that these "children are now, in thought, association, and conduct,
Jewesses, and a forced change to another environment and instructions in a different re-
ligious faith would be a tragic disregard of their welfare." Id. at 695.
A New York statute provides for the revocation of prior commitment orders if the
child's religion was erroneously reported in the prior hearings. N.Y. Dom. Rn. CT. Acr
§ 86(3). Since a large number of adoptions are privately arranged without extensive
investigation of either the child's background or his suitability to the adoptive home, the
child's religion could be erroneously reported, either by mistake or design. Comment,
Moppets on the Market, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950). Thus, this provision may be invoked to
upset such adoptions after the child has made a satisfactory adjustment to the home.
21. "A mandatory provision that placement must be with the same religious faith as
the parents would seem most undesirable. It has been our experience in the field of laws
relating to child protection that flexibility and discretion is always preferable to mandatory
requirements. It would also seem a mere matter of common sense that the harmony of
personalities between adoptive or foster parents and the child involved would be a far
more important factor than the matter of religious faith." Letter from Brooke Wunnicke,
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on child placement.2 2 Its importance should depend on the education, interests,
and emotional needs of the individual as well as the choice of available custo-
dians. 23 Where persons of the same religion are as capable of caring for the
child as those of a different religion, the child should be placed with his co-
religionists. 24 But where persons of a different religion can provide better
care, the court or agency should be able to place across religious lines. 25
Effect on use of existing facilities. Facilities for both long and short term child
care are grossly inadequate.2 6 Private homes meeting requisite psychological,
Executive Secretary, Wyoming Youth Council, March 4, 1954. "It would seem very uni-
wise to set up a mandatory criteria [sic] for placement. The field of social work has
developed a body of knowledge as background for an application by the skilled practi-
tioner in meeting individual children's needs." Letter from Miss Lorena Scherer, State
Child Welfare Supervisor, Missouri, Feb. 24, 1954.
22. The standard adoption law suggested by the Children's Bureau contains no re-
ligious requirements, but recommends that the child's religious heritage should be included
in the social study and report to the court. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, ESSENTIALS OF ADOPTION LAW AND PROCEDURE 17 (1949). A "when practicable"
requirement is in the Standard Juvenile Court Act drafted by the National Probation and
Parole Association, but there is no indication that it is to be applied inflexibly. NATIONAL
PROBATION AND PAROLE Ass'N, A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (1949).
23. "The primary factor in determining the type of home selected for a particular
child is drawn from the background of the child itself. The intent is to place the child
in a home which would be as near a normal situation as possible. We would then try to
select adoptive parents who had the same racial, religious and cultural background-
parents who would have roughly the same mental ability as the child." Letter from John
F. Larson, Director, Bureau of Services for Children, Utah, March 9, 1954.
24. All states which provided information, agreed on this procedure.
25. See Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super. 361, 108 A.2d 73
(1954), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3242 (U.S. 1955). "The few times in which I
believe this discretionary power [to place across religious lines] should be exercised
is when adoption agencies have made a long, conscientious search for adoptive
parents of the same religion as the child. If the search has been fruitless and
therefore the child could not know the security and feel the sense of belonging
which adoptive parents could give him, then I believe that the child should be
given that opportunity through placement with a couple of another faith rather than
face long-time boarding care in a foster care agency under the auspices of his religious
faith." Letter from Dorothea Coe, Executive Director, The Spence-Chapin Adoption
Service, New York, March 5, 1954. The result feared in the above quotation is what
occurred as an aftermath of the Santos case. The children remained in an institution for
a long period of time after the case. INTERVIEWS.
Religious differences should not preclude adoption of children who are physically
or emotionally handicapped and difficult to place. For other compelling reasons to place
across religious lines, see the next section of text dealing with the shortage of facilities
for child care. For a general discussion of religious factors and adoption, see Note, Re-
ligious Factors in Adoption, 28 IND. L.J. 401 (1953).
26. "For those children who must be cared for away from their own homes, facilities
are far from adequate. Nowhere in the country are there enough foster-family homes or
specialized group-care facilities to meet the need. Outside metropolitan areas the lack
is even more acute." Arnold, Meeting the Needs of Children and Youth, 25 Soc. SERV.
REv. 156, 158-59 (1951). See also Crystal, What Keeps Us from Giving Children What
We Know They Need, 27 Soc. SERV. Ray. 136 (1953); Osborn, Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren-Realities and Possibilities, 28 Soc. SERV. REV. 153 (1954) ; Clothier, Need of New
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financial, and social standards are difficult to locate.2 7 Private agencies, largely
sectarian, limit their admissions to children they consider desirable.P State
institutions, which must accept all whom the courts and departments of welfare
send, are seriously over-crowded.2 9 Yet some private agencies tend to lie jealous
of encroachments upon their respective shares of existing facilities and resist
public agency expansion. °
Arbitrary religious requirements compound these problems. Children are
often denied the special attention their individual needs require because the
only homes or agencies which can provide the proper care are in the hands of
Facilities for the Care of Disturbed Children, 34 MENT. HYG. 97 (1950). Nine states sup-
plied information about existing facilities and all rep.rted inadequacks.
Studies in New York have been the most detailed and demonstrate a glaring need fur
more facilities of all kinds; yet New York has a well developed child welfare
program compared to many other states. NEw YORK CITIZEN's Coz:rtrriE oF O:-i Ht:i-
DRED FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, CHILD WELFARE I\ NEw YOR- STATE, pts. IX and X
(1951); GELLuHORX, CHILDREN AND FAmILIFS IN THE COURTS OF NE\%. Yoni]: CITY 132-34,
141-48 (1954) ; KAHN, A CoUTr For CHILDREN 119-20, 245, 250-54, 314-15 (1953 ; Delin-
quents Jam Youth House, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1955, p. 29, col. 7.
Nevada is all but barren of child welfare facilities. There are no state funds for the
direct care of children, only one state institution, no local private institutiuns except one
private child placing agency, and only one county department of public nelfare. The
juvenile courts have no funds for child care. Letter from Mrs. Barbara C. Coughlan,
State Director, Nevada State Welfare Department, March 17, 1954. Wyoming is in a
similar position. The department of public welfare is the only social agucy in the state
and neither the state institutions nor the two private agencies have trained staffs. Letter
from Ethylyn Hartwell, Director, Division of Children's Services, Department uf Public
Welfare, Wyoming, Feb. 25, 1954. Delaware has no state facilities for physically handi-
capped children. Letter from Mrs. Florence A. Clark, Chief, Child Welfare Services,
Delaware, March 2, 1954.
27. "In general, foster-home agencies tend to indict the community for its lack of
generous impulse in opening doors to children who require a family atmosphere .... Our
frustration is inevitable when appeals for foster-homes evoke but little response or whten
in the response itself we find little that can serve the emotional needs of children." Crystal,
What Keeps Us From Giving Children What We know Thcy Need?, 27 So . S av. R x.
136 (1953). Thus, children who should be placed in foster homes are often placed in
institutions as the only facility available. Letter from Miss Lorena Scherer, State Child
Welfare Supervisor, Missouri, Feb. 24, 1954; KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 119-20,
245, 250-54, 31-1-15; GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 132-34, 141-48. Alabama, Cali-
fornia and Missouri conduct a continuous program of foster home recruitment by public
education and through civic organizations such as church groups, parent-teachers asso-
ciations, etc.
28. Seventeen states supplied information concerning the types of private agencies
in the state. A majority or substantial portion of such agencies are sectarian. And "the
sectarian and private institutions ...control their own intake. They accept only the
cases that strike them as suitable and within the limits of their own convenience ...!"
GELLHORNI, Op. cit. supra note 26, at 133. See also NEw YORK STTE CIzr~iRs' Co.m-
mITIEE OF ONE HUNDRED FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, CHILI) WELFARE IN NEW You%
STATE, 95-96, 99 (1951) and KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 251-53.
29. GEU.LoRN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 133; KAHN, op cit. slpra note 26, at 250-51.
30. KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 257-58. Confidential communication to the Vale
Law Journal on file in the Yale Law Library. INTERviEws.
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persons whose religion differs from that of the child.31 And state institutions,
non-sectarian by statute, become dumping grounds, since they provide the
only facilities available to children without regard to religious considerations.
112
Elimination of mandatory religious requirements would allow more effective
use of those private homes and agencies which are available for child care
and would, at least to some degree, reduce the overtaxing of state facilities.83
Effect on choice and and efficiency of probation officers. Children's courts
usually assign probation officers to neglected and delinquent children on the
basis of geography, case load, and special aptitude.8 4 But the New York City
Domestic Relations Court requires assignment to a child of the same religion. 5
And religious groups elsewhere are now pressing for similar requirements.0 0
Assignment of probation officers by religion increases the difficulty of obtain-
ing trained personnel and lowers the overall level of competence. By taking
a rough religious census of the children who come before it, the New York
Court has established quotas for Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish officers.37
Since vacancies must be filled by persons of the same religion as their prede-
31. INTERVIEWS. While there is need for expansion of all facilities, a recent New York
report noted the particular need for institutional facilities of particular religious faiths
in upstate New York. NEw YORK CITIZnNs' COMMITTEE OF ONE HUNDRED FOR C1t1u~rN
AND YOUTH, CHILD WELFARE IN NEv YORK STATE 99-100 (1951).
Also, in order to meet the needs of all groups in the community, "some modification
of the standards is required on occasion for minority groups." Letter from Miss Esther L.
Immer, Supervisor of Special Studies, Department of Social Welfare, Iowa, April 12,
1954. Thus, the overall level of child care may be lowered to increase facilities of certain
groups. The availability of facilities of various denominations is an important item in
granting new licenses to institutions and foster homes. Letter from Gerald A. Berlin, Esq.,
Boston Attorney, March 12, 1954.
32. KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 251. INTERviEVs. Naturally, the effectiveness and
reputation of state institutions are seriously damaged. GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 133.
33. Much community effort is needed to improve child care. The elimination of
mandatory requirements is a step in that direction. For the great number of problems
to be overcome in this field, see the various reports of the Mid-Century White House
Conference on Children and Youth, held in 1950. See also Lenroot, Child Welfare-A
Challenge to Private and Public Agencies, 24 Soc. SERv. R~v. 1 (1950).
34. Seven of the eight children's courts reported assignment in this manner.
35. N.Y. Dom. REL. CT. Acr § 25 states that probation officers shall be assigned to
children of the same faith "when practicable." However, this phrase is overlooked except
in boroughs with such small staffs that assignment by religion is practically impossible,
KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 142; GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 118-19. But in
the Children's Court of Erie County, which includes Buffalo, "probation workers are
never assigned to cases by religious denomination. We expect all of them to be free of
bias and to factually report." Letter from Victor B. Wylegala, Judge, Children's Court,
Erie County, N.Y., March 3, 1954.
36. There has been a strong movement in Massachusetts for a similar requirement.
INTERVIEVS.
37. These quotas are established on the basis of the children appearing before the
court rather than on the basis of the religious distribution of the population as a whole,
GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAmILIES IN TILE COURTS OF Nzw YORK CITY 118-19 (1954).
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cessors, the group from which a given officer may be chosen is substantially
limited, and more competent candidates may be excluded from consideration.3a
Assignment by religion also results in an inefficient use of probation offi-
cers.3 9 Since cases then cannot be assigned on a purely geographic basis,
officers waste a great amount of time travelling from one probationee to an-
other, and two officers may be working simultaneously in the same block.40
This time is extremely valuable to an already overburdened staff.41 And if
officers attempt to save time by arranging to meet probationees at a specified
place, usually a school, the semi-institutional setting creates an unnecessarily
formal atmosphere and prevents observation of the child's adjustment to
family and home environment.42
In those instances where rapport is better when the child and probation
officer are of the same religion, individual assignments can be made. There is
no need of the inefficiency of mandatory religious assignment to meet this
situation.4 3
Effect of compulsory religious cmditions of probation. Children's courts
encourage religious training for probationees. The majority recommend such
programs on an entirely voluntary basis. 44 But some courts require regular
religious observance and education as a condition of probation.4 5
38. The legality of such recruiting practices has been questioned. Simon, Racial and
Religious Democracy: Its Effect on Corrcctional [Vor:, NATioNAL PRORAIONe AND
P.&RoLE Ass'x YE.ARooYc 205, 206 (1951). Probation officers in New York City are
overworked and underpaid. GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 114-15; KAUn:, A CoUrT
FOR CH UREN 195-200 (1953). This alone makes the recruiting of competent personnel
extremely difficult. With trained candidates in short supply, the broadest possible base
for selection would seem a necessity.
39. For a critical analysis of the operation of probation in New York City, see K~nN,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 136-223, and GELLHORN, op. cit. smpra note 37, at 105-24.
40. "The annual loss of staff energy attributable to this one cause reaches a tremendous
aggregate." GE.Lvaom, op. cit. supra note 37, at 300.
41. Id. at 121-22.
42. See KAHNa, op. cit. supra note 38, at 186-87. For the need to observe the proba-
tioner's environment for successful probation, see DRESSLER, PROBJATION AND PAWoLE 46
(1951) ; Anderson, Comselor-Child Relationship, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PA.ozE AsS'N
YEKnoox 103, 105 (1951).
43. "[I]t is necessary that the assignment be on a geographical basis .... If more
than one officer is working in a particular area, then, of course, we attempt to make our
assignments more personal by taking into consideration racial, religious, and emotional
factors." Letter from William B. McKesson, Presiding Judge, Juvenile Department,
Superior Court, Los Angeles, California, March 11, 1954. "The assignment of probation
counselors to cases depends more upon the specific problem presented and the peculiar
qualifications of counselors than upon religious faith. However, if there is reason to
do so we assign Catholic officers to Catholic children." Letter from Paul W. Alexander,
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Toledo, Ohio, March
6, 1954.
44. Six courts specifically emphasized the point that religious programs for proba-
tioners should be entirely voluntary. Two of these courts reported that religious condi-
tions on probation are used by some judges, but the writer opposed such moves in both
letters. Two other courts frequently make religious observance and education a condition
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Compulsory religious practice is difficult to justify. Probation is designed
to afford advice and guidance in overcoming the problems which resulted
in court appearance. 4  Courtroom lectures on religion have little effect on a
frightened or belligerent youth. 4 And religious training, of itself, has a
doubtful effect on a delinquent's behavior. 48 If a religious program appears
advisable, it should be devised by the probation officer in conjunction with the
parents and clergy after the officer has had an opportunity to become familiar
with the child's problems.40  Judicially imposed religious exercise is seldom
warmly accepted, and may actually alienate the child from spiritual values .Y0
Constitutionality of Mandatory Religious Requirements
Mandatory religious requirements appear to be subject to serious constitu-
tional objections based on due process, freedom of religion, and the separation
of church and state.
Due process. The subordination of all other factors affecting child welfare to
religious considerations would seem to deny children their right to due process
of probation. In Virginia, "religious education and practice, as a condition of probation,
is illegal according to our law." Letter from David H. Katz, Jr., Chief Probation Officer,
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Richmond, Virginia, March 11, 1954. See Jones
v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
45. "It is the usual requirement of probation that the probationec attend sonic religious
service of his own choosing, or at the direction of his parents, at least once per week
while on probation." Letter from Walter H. Beckham, Judge, Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Dade County, Florida, Feb. 26, 1954. Also, sonic judges of the New
York City Domestic Relations Court impose religious conditions on probation. KAN,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 108.
46. For a discussion of the aims, methods and requirements of probation, see DinEsts-
LER, PROBATION AND PAROLE (1951).
47. For extreme instances of ineffective religious lectures by a judge, see KAHN, Op.
cit. supra note 38, at 108-12. See also GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 83-84.
48. Many studies have been made on the relationship between religius instruction and
the incidence of delinquency. Several are described and analyzed in TEtri s & RI;aINE-
MANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENcy 158-64 (1950); Wattenbcrg, Church Attend-
ance and Juvenile Misconduct, 34 SOClOL. AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 195 (1950). Cf. Harper
& Reinhardt, Four Relationship Status of a Group of Delinquent Boys, 21 J. Cuizx. L., C.
& P.S. 379 (1930). See also KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREIN 109 (1953); GELLIOIRN,
CHILDREN AND FAmILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEw YORK CITY 84 (1954), for citations to
other research projects on this subject.
49. There must be a readiness on the part of parents to use religious help as well
as a relation between the child's problem and religion before any religiou program can
be effective. See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 109.
50. "I have seen Orders made requiring the Ward to attend religious education
classes and church, but I have the feeling that a child who is in attendance at religiouq
services because of the compulsion of a Court Order is not apt to receive benefit as one
who attends a religious service voluntarily, or because of an inward desire." Letter from
William B. McKesson, Presiding Judge, Juvenile Department, Superior Court, Los
Angeles, California, March 11, 1954. See also KAHN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 48. For
various approaches which have been taken to make religion a deterrent to juvenile delin-




of law. Until children reach majority, their own welfare requires the impo-
sition of proper restraints designed to further their best interests.5' Parental
supervision is assumed to accomplish this end.5 2 The Ltate intervenes under
its parens patriae power only when the child's welfare is not being adequately
served by parental care.5 3 Hence the best interests of the child are at once
the source, direction, and limiting consideration in determining the reasonable-
ness of the state's action.54 Mandatory religious requirements prevent con-
sideration of the myriad factors which must be weighed if the child is to be
placed so as to maximize his welfare.5 5 Therefore, state action under such
arbitrary requirements deprives the child of his fundamental right to the pro-
tection of his best interests.5
G
51. Children are not entitled to the same degree of freedom as adults. In re Sharp, 15
Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908). But children do have certain rights, one uZ which is that
any restraint imposed must protect their welfare. Matter of Tienmies Guardianship, 233
App. Div. 541, 264 N.Y. Supp. 829 (4th Dep't 1933); People ex rcl. Brown v. Schiff, 49
N.Y.S2d 300 (Sup. Ct 1944). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 15. lt,i
(1944) ; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56, 62 At. 193, 201 (1.05).
52. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 483, 55, 62 AUt. 198, 201 (1905) ; cf. Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
53. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907); Milwaukee Industrial Schol v. Supcrvisors of Milwaulee
County, 40 Wis. 328 (1876). It is the duty of the state, as parens patriae, to afford
such protection to children whose parents are unfit. In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 127, 96
Pac. 563, 565 (1903) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 43, 56-57, 62 Ad. 193,
201 (1905) (same).
54. "He [the court] acts as parens patriac to do what is best for the interests of the
child .... He interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants, by virtue of the pre-
rogative which belongs to the Crown as parcns patriac." Finlay Y. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,
433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). See Guardianship of Walsh, 100 Cal. App. 2d 194, 223
P2d 322 (1950); In re Guardianship of Waite, 190 Iowa 1S2, 1SO N.W. 159 (1920);
'Matter of Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 53 N.E. 676 (1899); Commonwealth ex rel. Danie
v. Ferree, 175 Pa. Super. 586, 106 A.2d 681 (1954). See also Po-,a'r, , hEk2cvm Junirav-
DENCE §§ 1304, 1307 (5th ed. 1941); MADDEr, Do.1ESTic REL.,%Tos §§ 107-09 (1931).
Thus, if a child's best interests do not determine his custody, the state acts uutside its
authority. See note 51 supra. Cf. State ex rel. Raymond v. Lawrence, 86 Minn. 310
(1902).
55. See text and footnotes at pp. 776-7S supra under hcadiig Effect on use of scicntq
techniques.
56. In Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.2d 843 (.Mass. 1954), cert. dcnicd, 23 U.S.L.
VEEK 3201 (U.S. 1955), the adoption of twins by a family of a different religion was
denied. However, it was found that couples of the same religion, as well suitvd as the
petitioners, were desirous of adopting the tAins. Thus, the court may not ha'e felt that
the best interests of the children were endangered
While the power of the state to intervene in the custody of children is based on its
status as parens patriae, state regulation of children's activities while in the homes of
their natural parents is based on the police power. Thus, the state can regulate child
labor, Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913), and require children
at attend school, State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901). Even if state cuntrol
of the custody of children were based on its police power, mandatory religi ,us require-
ments would seem to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The exercise of the police pow cr
must have a reasonable relation to ends which are the legitimate objects of legislative action.
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Parental exercise of religion. The freedom of religion which is guaranteed by
the First Amendment 57 includes the right of fit parents to control the religious
training of their children.58 This includes the right to change the child's re-
ligion if the parents so choose.' 9 One way of changing the religious affiliations
of a child is to place it with persons of a different faith. Since mandatory
religious requirements prevent parents from doing this, their right to control
their children's religious development is impaired. 0
Separation of church and state. Mandatory religious requirements also appear
to violate constitutional prohibitions on the establishment of religion. One
of the main purposes of the First Amendment was to prevent the imposition
of religious status by political authority.0 1 Yet, where a parent consents to
adoption by persons of a different religionjudicial denial based upon manda-
tory requirements amounts to establishment of the child's religion in disregard
of parental wishes. 62 And the resulting restriction upon the choice of available
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). A mandatory requirement would
act as an irrebuttable presumption and preclude courts from determining the welfare of
the child. "A statute creating a presumption that is arbitrary or that operates to deny
a fair opportunity to repel it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• ..Mere legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the determination of issues
involving life, liberty or property." Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6 (1929).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I, which is applicable to the states. Illinois ex rel. MNc-
Collum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
58. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) : Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusett, 321 U.S. 15F,,
166 (1944) (dictum). But, neither rights of religion nor of parenthood are beyond limi-
tation if the state acts in a reasonable manner. Ibid.
59. People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). (.
People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936). Parents may not
be able to change a child's religion where serious emotional harm would result. Matter of
Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 597, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12, 17 (N.Y. Donm. Rel. Ct. 1953) (dictum).
60. This conclusion is not precluded by Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954),
cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. W-iK 3201 (U.S. 1955). The Massachusetts court specifically
declined to decide whether placement in the same religion would be "practicable" if the
natural mother, rather than merely consenting to adoption by petitioners, refused to give
the children to any couple but the petitioners.
61. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947). See also 2 Tim WarIINs
OF JEFFERSON 92-103 (1893).
62. In Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WX
3201 (U.S. 1955), the court found children to be of a certain religion because their
mother was of that religion. However, the children were not baptized and the mother
had consented to their being raised in a different faith. Therefore, the court was under
no compulsion to find the children to be members of any religion, and should have re-
stricted itself to deciding whether the adoption was for the children's best interests.
Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951), appeal
dismissed on other grounds, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952), is a more obvious
imposition of religion by a court. There, the trial court's determination that the children were
Jewish because of four years of intensive Jewish training and that it was for the best
interests of the children to remain in a home where "for the first time [they] found
security and happiness," Transcript of Record, p. 696, Matter of Santos, 304 N.Y. 483
[Vol. 64
NOTES
custodians impresses temporal consequences on the child due to his religion
of birth.' 3
Even where parents are unfit to make decisions affecting their children's
welfare, decisions based solely upon religion of birth seem to exceed the
state's constitutional authority. For, since all religions are equal before the
law, courts lack the power as well as the ability to decide that one will serve
a child's spiritual needs better than another." Nor may religious requirements
be justified on the ground that they protect "parental rights."0 Once parental
unfitness invokes state intervention, the child's welfare takes precedence over
parental prerogatives.' 6
Enforcement of religious observance and education as a condition of proba-
tion seems patently unconstitutional.6 7 No arm of government may compel
(1952), was reversed. The mother was unfit to care fur the children, and, thus, their
best interests should have been determinative. But the appellate court found the children
to be Catholics because of their baptism (without the father's consent, id. at 67) and their
mother's religion, and temporal consequences flowed from that decision; the children x-mre
removed from a fine adoptive home and placed under institutional care. For discuriun of
this case, see notes 10 and 20 supra. The rationale of the appellate division is by no
means final since the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds
and the case xas not appealed after the remand. For a criticism of placing su much
emphasis on baptism, see Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 694 (1952). See also, PFreizz-, Cuurcu,
STATE AND FRE.nom 588-91 (1953).
Those Supreme Court cases which have upheld state action against a claim of aid
to religion did not involve the issues present here. Rekased time from school, Zurach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), but sce Illinois ex reL McCvllum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Note, 61 Y..xL L.J. 405 (1952), and state transportati,-.n for
students of parochial schools, Everson v. Board of Education, 30 U.S. 1 (1947), do not
impose a particular religion upon a child which conflicts with his best interests or the
legally recognized rights of his parents.
63. See text and notes at pp. 776-02 supra under heading Effect of Rliious Reqtlrc-
ments on, Child Welfare. As a matter of pure logic, it may be argued that the mere con-
sideration of religion as one of many factors governing decisions concerning child care
would also result in an unconstitutional imposition of temporal consequences upon the child.
However, the released time cases indicate that the question of constitutionality or unconsti-
tutionality in this area is a matter of degree. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952),
noted in 61 YALE L.J. 405 (1952) ; Illinois cx rel. McCollum v. Board uf Education, 333
U.S. 1 (1947). Thus, the Supreme Court would be more likely to strike down a pru-
cedure which has a present detrimental effect upon the child than ctne which merely taes
religion into account in a manner not inconsistent wvith the child's Lest interests.
64. Desribes v. Wilmer, 69 Ala. 25 (181) ; State ex reL Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 59,
162 S.W. 119 (1913); Purinton v. Jamrcck, 195 Mass. 187, 1W N.E. S02 (1907); In re
Waite, 190 Iowa 182, ISO N.W. 159 (1920). For a different opinion, see 32 B.U.L. RE%-.
448 (1952).
65. For an analysis and collection of cases dealing with parental rights as a det.r-
minant of a child's religion after placement, see Nute, Rcligion as a Factor in Adoptfin,
Guardianship and Custody, 54 COLum. L REv. 376 (1954).
66. In, re Clough, 28 Ariz. 204, 236 Pac. 700 (192) ; Guardianship of Walsh, 100 Cal.
App. 2d 194, 223 P2d 322 (1950); Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 0 N.E. 82
(1907).
67. Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E2d 444 (1946). Although
a privilege and not a right, probation cannot be conditioned unconstitutionally. Fleanor
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
either attendance at any church or belief in any religion.08 And since the con-
stitutional prohibition bars aid to religion as such, as well as to any particular
denomination, the fact that all religions benefit equally is irrelevant. 0
Conclusion
Mandatory religious requirements, whether statutory or administrative,
seriously impede the administration of child welfare programs. They impair
effective utilization of existing facilities and techniques for child care, curtail
the effectiveness of probation programs, and are open to serious constitutional
objections. Religion should be viewed as one of many interrelated factors which
must be considered in determining how to promote the child's welfare. Only
in this way can the child's best interests be safeguarded in a manner compatible
with the constitutional rights of all parties involved.70
v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941) ; United States ex rel. Howard v. Ragen, 59
F. Supp. 374 (N.D. IIl. 1945). See, also, Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529
(1922) ; People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950).
68. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ; ci. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Note, 61
YALE L.J. 405 (1952).
69. "Neither [state or federal governments] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
70. The following quotation from the Indiana Department of Public Welfare Rules
and Regulations is typical of an approach which fulfills the state's obligation to the child
without unduly restricting parental preferences or infringing basic constitutional principles:
"Each child-placing agency, after giving lue consideration to the emotional and physical
needs and religious background of the child or parents of the child, shall select a foster
home or child-caring institution wherein the foster care given to the child will be for the
best interests of the child." INDIANA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, RULES AND REGULATIONS
tit. III, reg. 3-210(d).
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